

COUNTRY SUMMARY - NORWAY

EMBARGOED UNTIL 29 JAN. 2013 - 2:01 GMT

POLITICAL - 90%	Defence & Security Policy	Legislative Scrutiny	4	
		Defence Committee	4	
		Defence Policy Debated	3	
		CSO Engagement	3	
		International AC Instruments	4	
		Public Debate	4	
		AC Policy	4	
		AC Institutions	4	
		Public Trust	3	
		Risk Assessments	3	
	Defence budgets	Acquisition Planning	3	
		Budget Transparency & Detail	4	
		Budget Scrutiny	4	
		Budget Publicly Available	4	
		Defence Income	4	
		Internal Audit	4	
		External Audit	4	
		Other Political Areas	Natural Resources	3
	Organised Crime Links		3	
	Organised Crime Policing		4	
	Intelligence Services Oversight		4	
Intelligence Services Recruitment	3			
Export Controls	4			
FINANCE -86%	Asset Disposals		Asset Disposal Controls	4
		Asset Disposal Scrutiny	4	
	Secret Budgets	Percentage Secret Spending	0	
		Legislative Access to Information	4	
		Secret Program Auditing	3	
		Off-budget Spending in Law	4	
		Off-budget Spending in Practice	-	
		Information Classification	4	
	Links to Business	Mil. Owned Businesses Exist	4	
		Mil. Owned Business Scrutiny	-	
PERSONNEL - 85%	Leadership	Public Commitment	4	
		Measures for Corrupt Personnel	3	
		Whistleblowing	4	
		Special Attention to Sensitive Personnel	2	
	Payroll and Recruitment	Numbers of Personnel Known	4	
		Pay Rates Openly Published	4	
		Well-established Payment System	4	
		Objective Appointments	3	
	Conscription	Objective Promotions	3	
		Bribery to Avoid Compulsory Conscription	4	
	Salary Chain	Bribery for Preferred Postings	4	
		Ghost Soldiers	4	
	Values, Standards, Other	Chains of Command and Payment	4	
		Code of Conduct Coverage	3	
		Code of Conduct Breaches Addressed	3	
		AC Training	3	
		Prosecution Outcomes Transparent	2	
		Facilitation Payments	3	
	OPS - 55%	Controls in the Field	Military Doctrine	2
			Operational Training	2
			AC Monitoring	2
Controls on Contracting			3	
Private Military Contractors			2	
PROCUREMENT - 74%			Government Policy	Legislation
	Transparent Procurement Cycle	3		
	Oversight Mechanisms	4		
	Purchases Disclosed	4		
	Capability Gap	Standards Expected of Companies	4	
		Strategy Drives Requirements	4	
		Requirements Quantified	3	
	Tendering	Open Competition v. Single-Sourcing	1	
		Tender Board Controls	3	
		Anti-Collusion Controls	3	
	Contract Delivery / Support	Procurement Staff Training	2	
		Complaint Mechanisms for Firms	4	
		Sanctions for Corruption	4	
	Offsets	Due Diligence	2	
		Transparency	2	
		Competition Regulation	2	
	Other	Controls of Agents	3	
		Transparency of Financing Packages	3	
		Subsidiaries / Sub-Contractors	1	
		Political Influence	3	

Norway is placed in Band B. Political corruption risk is low, with strong institutions in place, and high levels of transparency. There are no indications of undue influence or criminal activity. The budget is accessible, as is information on defence policy issues, and considerable debate across civil society is observed. Although classified items are discussed in an extended (rather than standard) parliamentary committee, parliamentary disclosure is forced if six committee members desire this to be so. Some sophisticated mechanisms are indicated to be in place: where the process of internal audit of expenditure has been found to be insufficient, the criticisms themselves have been made publicly available. Internal audit involves discussion of the findings of external audit by the National Audit Office (NAO). Furthermore, after the intelligence services were found to have carried out illegal surveillance, this led to reform.

In **finance**, there is extensive and regular auditing of, and evidence of attempts to improve asset disposals. Key parliamentary figures in the Foreign and Defence Committee are given details on secret items in the budget, and there is no evidence of off-budget expenditure. One military-owned business, Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway SF, is in existence, though no reports of problems with military-owned businesses exist, nor does evidence of unauthorised private enterprise. Nevertheless, the percentage of the budget spent on secret items is not disclosed to the public.

In terms of **personnel corruption risk**, along with evidence of strong commitment to anti-corruption by senior leadership, Norway has robust payment and conscription systems and the potential for corruption is recognised to be small. The Siemens Scandal was found to illustrate encouragement of whistle-blowing, however, there are inadequate systems of punitive law due to few punishments arising from the incident. There is a lack of a systematic approach to processes involving staff in particularly sensitive positions, and limited transparency of appointments and promotions to the highest levels. The government recognises the need for improvement in both cases.

In **operations corruption risk**, there is limited clarity concerning anti-corruption in military doctrine and little certainty on the degree of anti-corruption activity in terms of operational training, monitoring, and contracting. Nonetheless, governmental efforts to reduce corruption in operations in Afghanistan are evident, and include aiding the establishment of Integrity Watch there.

On the **procurement** front, rules for the defence sector specifically address defence corruption, and there is disclosure of the purchasing cycle and of purchases themselves. Objective procurement plans rather than opportunism is indicated to drive purchases, though the NAO has found occasional slips. Over 60 per cent of recent procurement was single-sourced. Although training among procurement staff was previously recognised to have been inadequate, improvements have been installed. The assessment shows that offsets are generally well-regulated, but regulation of subcontractors is insufficient.

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